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The prospect of a Greek exit from the Euro, or of Greece defaulting on its government debts,
has created huge anxiety because both appear to be steps into the complete unknown.
However, Mark Hallerberg argues that looking at the potentially similar case of Argentina’s
debt default can suggest interesting temporary solutions. From 1998 to 2001 Argentina’s
provinces coped with many after-shock problems by issuing their own regional currencies. A
similar approach might work to mitigate the worst effects in Greece.
The recent debate about the Greek predicament after the May 6 elections has again turned to
whether Greece should stay in the Eurozone. When the question first came up two years
ago, there were suggestions for some sort of interim solution. Martin Feldstein (2010) argued that Greece
should only temporarily leave the Eurozone. Julian Le Grand has suggested on this blog that the country
could leave, but then instantly rejoin the Eurozone at a devalued level. Reflecting on the Argentine example,
de la Torre et al suggested that direct bailouts would be preferable to the route that Argentine provinces took
when they issued their own currencies pegged to the peso in the run-up to the collapse.
While EU authorities and the IMF have
taken that advice not once but twice, and
while the second bailout included
significant debt restructuring, the country
remains in trouble. There are three
immediate problems facing Greek
authorities. The first is that, despite the
debt ‘haircut’ a few months ago, the Greek
debt level remains very high at about 160
per cent of GDP. This makes it difficult to
get to the primary surplus the troika (the
EU, IMF, and the European Central Bank)
would like to see in place. The second
issue is an uncompetitive economy. Real
wages will have to continue to fall. Note
that both problems require time to
address, probably 3-5 years at a
minimum. The third problem is political –
the population has severe reform fatigue.
The Argentine example from 1998 to 2001
may yet be instructive for the Greeks and address all three problems.  The provinces issued their own
currencies at the time and paid their workers as well as their bills in these currencies. Crucially, they also
pegged their new currencies to the national currency, the peso. Nominal wages remained the same.
These policies of course did not end the crisis. A big problem in Argentina’s case was that too many
provinces took this step; as de la Torre et al note, the quasi-monies in the Argentine case did not lead to a
devaluation, and a run on the peso in any case led to a monetary contraction, which had the opposite effect
intended. In Europe’s case, however, there would be plenty of remaining euro liquidity and the ECB would
have every incentive to maintain that liquidity for the rest of the Eurozone, something the Argentine central
bank in the end could not do and the international community was not interested in doing to help Buenos
Aires. Would it make sense for one country in Europe to follow the same route as the sub-national
governments of this southern country did? Thomas Mayer from Deutsche Bank has also raised this issue
recently in his call for a ‘geuro’, and the Argentine example suggests that such a move could make sense.
Imagine the following scenario. The government issues quasi-notes, which are known as ‘Ploutos’ (named
after the god of wealth). The government pays its employees and those who have debt against the
government in Ploutos instead of Euros. Moreover, the government issues a promise on the bills that Ploutos
will be fully convertible into euros in 5 years. These Ploutos are also fully transferable. As in the Argentine
provincial case, the government will also accept them for the payment of taxes and services.
What are the economic effects? Because there is uncertainty about the ability of the government to fulfill its
obligations and because of opportunity costs, these bills trade at a discount. This means in practice a real
salary cut in the wages of public workers. Because some of these notes will disappear over time, they
provide the government with some amount of seignorage. (Technically seignorage is the revenue obtained
directly by the government from minting coin or printing notes, which is the difference between the cost of
metal or notes and their face value. Here seignorage arises because the government realizes more value
from the notes it has issued than it actually has to make good on).  In the Argentine case, nominal salaries
remained the same, and governments could pay on time. The payment in these quasi-moneys generated
less discomfort in the population than the reduction in nominal salaries that the Argentine federal government
instituted, and which the government had to reverse later on in the crisis.
What about the political effects? One would think there would be more riots in the streets as angry civil
servants take to the barricades. This may happen, but matters were not so dire in Argentina. Initially, the
anger was turned on the private sector for not accepting the various scripts, not at the provincial government
for issuing them. Eventually most businesses took them, and, because the government would accept them at
face value for taxes, they knew they could move the script.
One should be realistic about what this course of action does and does not do. Foreign debts in Greece that
are denominated in euros would remain as onerous as before. So the move does not on its own solve the
country’s competitiveness problem. In fact, because the currency should return to par in five years, it is not a
longer-term devaluation. This is not a bazooka or magic bullet.
A key aspect of this proposal is that it buys the government time to continue reforms. It provides a limited
internal devaluation that does not imply a full rewriting of contracts in the private sector and the economic
damage that implies with a full euro exit. Moreover, because these bills become fully convertible into euros at
a fixed time in the future so long as the government keeps its promises, it provides identifiable winners in
Greek society from reforms. Greece sorely needs a political constituency to support the reform effort, and this
proposal would make many more people clear winners.
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